International Lawyer
Volume 10

Number 2

Article 5

1976

The Need to Reform Section 592 of the Tariff Act of 1930
Robert E. Herzstein

Recommended Citation
Robert E. Herzstein, The Need to Reform Section 592 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 10 INT'L L. 285 (1976)
https://scholar.smu.edu/til/vol10/iss2/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted
for inclusion in International Lawyer by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please
visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

ROBERT E. HERZSTEIN*

The Need to Reform Section 592 of
the Tariff Act of 1930t
Section 592 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1592, imposes penalties for
erroneous statements to the Customs Service in connection with the importation
of merchandise. The penalty imposed may be excessive in amount and may bear
no reasonable relationship to the offense which has been committed. Further,
penalties are imposed by the Customs Service without rudimentary due process
protections and without adequate opportunities for meaningful judicial review.
The penalties may arguably be penal in nature, and thus the Constitution may
require that those accused of violating section 592 are entitled to the protections
afforded in criminal prosecutions.
Because of the draconian nature of the sanctions under section 592 and the
absence of adequate procedural due process and judicial review with respect to
administration of this section, legislative reform of the section is necessary to
bring it into accord with current notions of fairness and to take into account the
legitimate interests and concerns of persons who must conduct their businesses
subject to the strictures of the statute.
I. The Provisions of Section 592

and Related Statutes
Section 592 makes it unlawful for any person to import or attempt to import
merchandise into the United States "by means of any fraudulent or false invoice,
declaration, affidavit, letter, paper, or by means of any false statement, written
or verbal, or by means of any false or fraudulent practice or appliance," unless
*LL.B. Harvard Law School 1955. Currently with the law firm of Arnold & Porter; Co-Chairman of
the International Law Section's Committee on Tariffs, Customs, the GATT and Regional Trade
Agreements; Vice Chairman of the American Society of International Law's Panel on International
Trade Policy and Institutions.
tThis Article is in large part drawn from a memorandum prepared by the Committee on Tariffs,
Customs, the GATT and Regional Trade Agreements of the Section of International Law of which
Mr. Herzstein is Co-Chairman. The memorandum was prepared as an information report in the
course of the Committee's study of section 592 which resulted in the adoption of a resolution by the
American Bar Association's House of Delegates in August 1975.
Many persons contributed to the memorandum. The author wishes especially to recognize the
contributions made by Stephen L. Gibson, Brooksley Landau, Daniel Lewis and Patrick Macrory.
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that person has "reasonable cause to believe the truth of such statement." The
statutory penalty is forfeiture of the merchandise itself or a fine equal to its
domestic value. By its terms the statute applies even where the false statement
would not result in an underpayment of duty, and the term "false statement" is
considered by the Customs Service to embrace negligent as well as intentional
statements.'
The penalty under section 592 is generally administratively assessed by the
Customs Service. The Customs Service does have administrative discretion to
mitigate the penalty. 19 U.S.C. § 1618 gives the Secretary of the Treasury
authority to mitigate forfeitures and penalties under various statutes, including
section 592, "upon such terms and conditions as he deems just and reasonable,"
and in the case of section 592 this authority has been delegated to the
Commissioner of Customs. 2 In most cases the penalty is mitigated to some
multiple (generally between two and ten) of the duty underpayment resulting
from the erroneous statement.
If the importer refuses to pay a penalty (whether or not mitigated), section 592
may be enforced in an action commenced by the United States in a U.S. district
court. Once the United States has established "probable cause" to believe that a
violation of the statute has occurred-a task which can be accomplished simply
by demonstrating an error in the entry documents 3-the burden of proof is placed
on the respondent to show that in fact a violation has not occurred. 4 19 U.S.C.

§ 1615.
In addition to the section 592 penalty, criminal liability for entry of goods by
means of false statements may be imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 542, which is
similar in terms to section 592.
II. The Penalty Imposed Under Section 592 May Bear
No Relationship to the Nature of the Offense
The amount of the potential penalty under section 592 is excessive. The only
statutory limitation on the penalty is the U.S. value of the merchandise covered by
the false statement, which may of course run to many thousands of dollars.
Accordingly, the sanctions available under this civil penalty statute can far
'For reasons explained below, very few section 592 proceedings reach the courts, so that there has
been little opportunity to test this interpretation. In Jen Dao Chen v. United States, 385 F.2d 939 (9th
Cir. 1967), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that intent to defraud was
required under section 592. However, this holding was in effect overruled a few years later in United
States v. Wagner, 434 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1970), in which the court said that the term "intent" as used
inJen Dao Chen must be equated with the "reasonable cause to believe" language in section 592. See
also Kohner v. Wechsler, 477 F.2d 666,673 n. 12 (2d Cir. 1973) (concurring opinion of Timbers, J.).
'The District Directors of Customs have authority to mitigate causes where the forfeiture value is
$25,000 or less. 19 C.F.R. § 171.21. All other cases must be sent to Customs Headquarters in
Washington for final decision.
'See, e.g., United States v. Nephrite Jade, 325 F. Supp. 986, 989 (W.D. Mo. 1970).
'See, e.g., United States v. Alcatex, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 129, 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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exceed the penalties normally found in criminal statutes, even for felonies. It is
particularly anomalous that the penalty which may be imposed under section 592
may easily exceed the maximum $5,000 fine that can be imposed for a criminal
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 542, where the standards of proof that prevail are
much stricter than in the forfeiture action.
Further, the sanctions imposed by section 592 are in most cases out of all
proportion to the seriousness of the offense. When penalties are established for
most legal infractions-by the legislature or the courts-careful consideration is
customarily given to the degree of culpability of the offender and to the
consequences of his offense. However, in section 592 cases there is no predictable
correlation between the value of goods in a given shipment and the culpability of
the importer responsible for an error in the entry papers or the amount of duty
underpaid.
Thus, under section 592 a $10 million dollar aircraft could be forfeited for false
statements that resulted from mere negligence and produced a duty
underpayment of a few hundred dollars. The value of shipments entered over a
period of months or years and amounting to tens of millions of dollars could be
forfeited upon discovery of errors resulting from negligence of an importer's
clerical personnel, even though they produced relatively small duty
underpayments. In a recent proceeding which attracted wide attention, a penalty
notice was issued to Standard-Kollsman, Inc., an electronics manufacturer,
claiming a penalty of some $42.5 million. The duty underpayment which gave rise
to the penalty proceeding was reported to be around $115,000, i.e., about 0.3
5
percent of the penalty asserted .
Although statutory penalties are frequently mitigated by the Customs Service,
the mere issuance of a penalty notice of such magnitude creates an
extraordinarily serious problem for the firm receiving it. Publicly-held companies
must disclose contingent liabilities of this kind, and any company attempting to
obtain financing would have to reveal the contingent liability in its financial
statements. It is almost certainly no coincidence that the publicly-quoted price of
Standard-Kollsman's stock dropped by 20 percent in the four weeks following the
issuance of the penalty notice, but recovered most of this on the day after the
penalty had been mitigated to $1.65 million.
The unreasonableness and excessiveness of the sanctions under section 592 are
particularly clear when they are imposed upon a person who is innocent of any
5
See Form 8-K for period ending December 31, 1972, filed by Standard-Kollsman, Inc., with the
Securities and Exchange Commission. It is interesting to note that if Standard-Kollsman had
underpaid its taxes by $115,000, the highest civil penalty that could have been assessed against it
would have been $57,500, if the underpayment had been deliberate, or $5,750, if it had been
negligent. See 26 U.S.C. § 6653(a) and (b).
It has also been reported that a company was assessed a $10,000 penalty in connection with a
clerical error in currency conversion which resulted in a $36 duty underpayment. Letter from
Electronic Industries Association to Hon. Wilbur D. Mills, Sept. 27, 1973.
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wrongdoing or has been merely negligent. As stated above, the Customs Service
has taken the position that a penalty may be imposed on a person who made a
false statement because of negligence. Further, forfeiture of goods in the
possession of a wholly innocent importer may be authorized by the statute.
The excessive size of the penalty and its lack of any reasonable relationship to
the state of mind of the violator or to the amount of harm caused by the violation
raise substantial issues under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendmentthe violator may arguably be arbitrarily and capriciously deprived of his property.
Further, it might be argued that section 592 permits unreasonable seizures of
property in violation of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures or involves the imposition of an excessive fine
in violation of the provisions of the Eighth Amendment.
In addition, the penalties imposed under section 592 would seen to contravene
the policy expressed in a provision of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade:
No contracting party shall impose substantial penalties for minor breaches of customs
regulations or procedural requirements. In particular, no penalty in respect of any
omission or mistake in customs documentation which is easily rectifiable and obviously
made without fraudulent intent or gross negligence shall be greater than necessary to
serve merely as a warning. Art. VIII(3).
The GATT does not commit the United States to action inconsistent with prior
legislation. 6 Since section 592 was a United States law prior to the United States
undertaking to apply the provisions of GATT, it has not been superceded by this
GATT provision. However, since section 592 is vague and extremely broad, it
might be argued that section 592 should be construed, in light of this provision of
the GATT, to apply only to false statements made intentionally or recklessly.
Ill. The Customs Service Procedures for Assessing a
Penalty Pursuant to Section 592 Do Not Provide Due
Process Protections to the Alleged Violator
Penalties have been assessed and seizures have been made by Customs under
section 592 without procedural protections normally associated with due process.
There has generally been no adequate notice given of the facts upon which
Customs bases its conclusion that a penalty or forfeiture has been incurred, no
hearing before an impartial hearing examiner, no right of cross-examination of
adverse witnesses, and no final determination with findings of fact and statements of the reasons for the decision.
The penalty notices are usually prepared by junior officials in the Customs
Service, who may have little appreciation of the serious financial consequences
that may follow the mere issuance of a notice, and often have received no more
'Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade,

1 1(b).
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than a cursory review by the District Director before being issued. 7 The notice is
usually extremely brief and conclusive in nature, and requests for additional
information in the past have rarely produced useful results.
Once a penalty notice has been issued, Customs officials at the local level may
be reluctant to revoke it, even though the subsequently developed facts indicate
that the statute has not been violated. Having put the respondent to the time and
expense of investigating the facts and preparing a petition for mitigatior they
may be reluctant to admit that the notice may have been issued in error, and the
temptation to pass the matter on to Customs Headquarters in Washington for
final decision is very strong.
Of course, Customs Headquarters relies heavily on the factual findings and
recommendations of the local officials in reaching its decision. Determinations of
liability apparently are made by Customs principally on the basis of information
developed by Customs agents during their field investigation. The results of that
investigation have not customarily been made available to the person receiving
the penalty notice. Because of the absence of due process procedures, efforts to
contest penalty assessment under section 592 generally have taken the form of
negotiation between the alleged violator and the Service, rather than adjudicatory
fact-finding process.
A recent action by the Customs Service may provide some procedural rights to
the importer. On January 16, 1975, the Service published new regulations which
provide that, prior to issuing a penalty notice, the District Director must in most
circumstances notify the importer of his intention to issue such notice and must
describe the merchandise involved, the provisions of law violated and the acts or
omissions constituting the violation. The importer may reply to such notice in
writing within 30 days "either refuting the allegations or establishing that
reasonable cause existed for believing that the acts or omissions described in the
allegations were proper." 40 Fed. Reg. 2797-98 (Jan. 16, 1975). In addition the
District Director may permit oral argument. The District Director must consider
the reply of the importer, determine whether it disproves the claim and either
notify the importer that a penalty notice will not issue or issue the penalty notice.
The degree of relief to be obtained by the importers from this prepenalty-notice
procedure depends in great part on how it is implemented: the specificity of the
notice provided, the frequency with which hearings are held, etc. In any event, the
procedure will not provide a hearing as a matter of right before an impartial
decision maker nor will it require a determination based on findings of fact and
conclusions of law.
'Moreover, it seems that in some cases penalty notices may have been issued even where the
Customs officials do not have reason to believe that section 592 was violated, simply as a convenient
means of correcting nonculpable errors. Customs Service officials cite the case of a District Director
who issued a penalty notice against an importer who was complying with a Customs Service ruling
which he had received but which the District Director considered erroneous.
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 10, No. 2
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Where a seizure is involved, the alleged violator is at the mercy of the Customs
Service. Seizure can be and is made upon suspicion of a section 592 violation,
even before the penalty notice is issued, and unless the claimant is willing to
pre-pay the penalty, the goods remain under seizure until the Service makes its
final determination on the amount of penalty it will impose. 8
IV. Procedures Followed by the Customs Service with
Respect to Mitigation of a Penalty Also Lack
Adequate Safeguards for the Petitioner
A person receiving a penalty notice may petition the Customs Service for
mitigation or remission of the penalty. The proceedings relating to such petition
are informal and discretionary with the Service. No provision is made for a
hearing, nor has the petitioner generally been afforded any additional
information relating to the reasons for the imposition of the penalty. 9 The
Customs Service does not give reasons for its decision whether to mitigate, nor
does it make factual findings on which it bases its decision.
The Service has recently taken a step in the right direction by publishing
standards relating to mitigation. 39 Fed. Reg. 39061 (Nov. 5, 1974); 40 Fed. Reg.
2797 (Jan. 16, 1975). Previously, a petitioner had little means of determining
what information would be relevant to the mitigation determination. Now the
published guidelines indicate that the usual mitigated penalty consists of a
multiple of the duty underpayment and that the multiple varies according to the
state of mind of the violator. But the Customs Service has still refused to disclose
the multiples actually used by it.
V. Judicial Review of the Customs Service's
Decision Is Inadequate
The sole method for obtaining judicial review of a penalty to date has been for
the person who has been penalized to refuse to pay the penalty. ' In such a

'See 19 C.F.R. §§ 162.21,162,41,162.44. Under 19C.F.R. § 162.44 the Commissioner of Customs
or a District Director may release the seized property to the claimant provided that the claimant pays
to Customs the appraised domestic value of the seized property. Under an unpublished administrative
rule, Customs has modified the regulation to permit the claimant to obtain release of the property
upon payment of a multiple of lost revenues which is set by the Service on a case-by-case basis.
'An ORR Ruling, 74-0203 (Sept. 26, 1974), provides that "attorneys should be furnished with
specific information necessary to enable them to prepare petitions for relief.
... Whether this
ruling will in practice result in sufficient notice to the petitioner is not yet clear.
"iln a case filed in 1974 an importer which paid mitigated penalties after negotiations with Customs
is attempting to obtain judicial review of the imposition of the penalty and a declaratory judgment that
section 592 is unconstitutional. BSR Ltd. v. Morgan, Civ. No. 74-2246, S.D.N.Y., filed May 23, 1974.
The government however filed a counterclaim for the full amount of the statutory penalty. If the
government is allowed to press its counterclaim, even the declaratory judgment route for seeking
judicial review of the constitutionality of the statute would be precluded except to a party willing to
risk having to pay the full statutory penalty.
InternationalLawyer.Vol. 10, No. 2
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situation the United States has had to bring an enforcement action in a district
court.
In an enforcement action the court will only determine whether section 592 has
been violated. It will refuse to review the Service's mitigation decision. 1 See, e.g.,
United States v. One 1970 Buick Riviera, 463 F.2d 1168 (5th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 980 (1972); United States v. One 1961 Cadillac, 337 F.2d 730
(6th Cir. 1964). This refusal to review the administrative procedures is probably
erroneous and certainly deprives the person penalized of effective review of
government action substantially harming him. One of the leading authorities on
administrative law has concluded, after a careful review of the mitigation powers
conferred by 19 U.S.C. § 1618, that:
A reviewing court, without at any point substituting judgment, could (a) determine
the reasonableness of the rules developed by the administrator as a guide to discretion,
(b) require that those rules be open to public inspection, (c)ascertain whether the particular exercise of discretion arbitrarily departs from the administrative case law, (d) require that the administrative case law be open to public inspection in compliance with
§ 3(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act, (e) require findings of fact and a statement
of reasons, (f)determine whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence, (g)
determine whether the stated reasons are based upon considerations which are reasonable and legal! 'In an enforcement action the person penalized loses the benefit of any
mitigation which may have been administratively granted. The court has no
discretion under the statute to mitigate the amount of the penalty (the full U.S.
value of the goods), and the Customs Service refuses to mitigate if a case goes to
trial. 13
In the case of Standard-Kollsman, described above, the Customs Service
agreed to mitigate a $42.5 million penalty to $1.65 million. If Standard-Kollsman
had wished to challenge the Customs Service's determination that section 592 had
been violated, it would have had to take into consideration the fact that the
consequence of losing in court would have been, not a $1.65 million penalty, but
the full original assessment of $42.5 million. Given the breadth of the statute and
the fact that the burden of proof in a section 592 proceeding is on the respondent,
it is clear that the respondent cannot afford to take the case to court unless he is
confident of winning. Even an estimated 95 percent chance of success would
hardly justify risking a penalty of $42.5 million.
"However, a decision by the Secretary of the Treasury that he has no power to act under the
mitigation statute is reviewable. Cotonificio Bustese, S.A. v. Morganthau, 121 F.2d 884 (D.C. Cir.
1941). Cf United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 721 (1971).
2
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 981-982 (1970 Supp.). Cf. Wong Wing Hang v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 360 F.2d 715, 718-719 (2d Cir. 1966).
"In an unreported decision, Andean Credit, S.A. v. United States (Case No. 73-1294-CIV-WM,
December 10, 1973), the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida refused to
order forfeiture of a yacht valued at over $1 million, which it stated would be "so severe a penalty as to
be shocking to the conscience of this Court." The court instead ordered payment of the unpaid duties,
which amounted to $60,000. The court's reasoning was rather unclear, but its result shows a
ieluctance to assess the full amount of the statutorily required penalty.
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Thus, in order to obtain judicial review of a penalty, the person penalized must
forego the mitigation of a penalty which is in all probability excessive and
unrelated to the offense involved. One might well argue that this requirement
placed an unconstitutional burden on the right to judicial review.
The situation is analogous to a procedure whereby a criminal defendant could
only appeal from conviction upon pain of receiving the maximum sentence,
instead of that imposed by the trial court, if he does not prevail. Such a
requirement would clearly be unconstitutional. See, e.g., North Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 724 (1969), in which the Supreme Court said:
A court is without right to ... put a price on an appeal. A defendant's exercise of a
right of appeal must be free and unfettered ....
[Ilt is unfair to use the great power
given to the court to determine sentence to place the defendant in the dilemma of
making an unfree choice.''
The Supreme Court faced a somewhat similar situation in Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. 123 (1908). There a railroad company challenged the constitutionality of a
Minnesota statute which imposed heavy fines and possible imprisonment for
failure to charge the rates established by a state commission. The Court held that
the enforcement provisions of the act were "unconstitutional on their face," 209
U.S. at 148, since they effectively prevented judicial review of the validity of the
ratemaking power. The court further stated:
It may therefore be said that when the penalties for disobedience are by fines so
enormous and imprisonment so severe as to intimidate the company and its officers
from resorting to the courts to test the validity of the legislation, the result is the same as
if the law in its terms prohibited the company from seeking judicial construction of laws
which deeply affect its rights....
Now, to impose upon a party interested the burden of obtaining a judicial decision of
such a question (no prior hearing having ever been given) only upon the condition that if
unsuccessful he must suffer imprisonment and pay fines as provided in these acts, is, in
effect, to close up all approaches to the courts, and thus prevent any hearing upon the
question whether the rates as provided by the acts are not too low, and therefore invalid.
209 U.S. at 147-48.
As mentioned above, a further inadequacy relating to judicial review is that the
burden of proof in an enforcement action is on the respondent rather than the
government. Thus, even in court the government need not justify in detail its
imposition of the penalty.
VI. If the Penalty Were Determined to be Penal In
Nature, the Person Penalized Would Be Entitled
to Additional Protections
In light of the excessive and obviously punitive nature of the penalties imposed
under section 592 it might be argued that they are penal in nature and thus that
the person penalized is entitled to the protections accorded a criminal defendant
1'Cf

James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 142 (1972); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310 (1966).
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under the Bill of Rights. It may be difficult to prevail on such an argument since
the Supreme Court has recognized the criminal nature of certain civil penalties
only in a very narrow range of cases such as the cases involving deprivation of

citizenship.
Nevertheless, it is useful to review the protections afforded in a criminal
prosecution which are lacking with respect to section 592. Such a review is
especially revealing in light of the fact that in a proceeding under the applicable
criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 542, on the same facts and resulting in a smaller fine
than a section 592 proceeding, the defendant would be entitled to such
protections.
Rights granted to a criminal defendant but denied to a person penalized
pursuant to section 592 include the presumption of innocence, the right to remain
silent, the right to indictment by a grand jury, and the application of double
jeopardy rules.
VII. Reform of Section 592
Legislative reform of section 592 is imperative to assure reasonable sanctions
and adequate procedures for imposing them. Various legislative proposals have
been introduced in Congress'" or are in the process of being drafted.
SCongressman Roybal of California has introduced a bill to reform section 592. H.R. 11089, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. The bill states the basic offense generally in terms of section 592, except that no
liability is incurred unless the United States is or may be deprived of lawful duties by the false or
fraudulent action. The sanction for violation has been changed from forfeiture or an equivalent
penalty to a penalty stated in terms of a percentage of the underpayment of duties. Where a violation
occurred and the underpayment was due to negligence or unintentional disregard of customs laws and
regulations without intent to defraud, a penalty duty of 5 %of the underpayment would be assessed on
the merchandise. If the underpayment were due to fraud, there would be assessed on the merchandise
a penalty duty equal to 50% of the underpayment of duties. These percentages are based on the
income tax penalty provisions contained at 26 U.S.C. § 6653. The bill also would permit Customs to
assess duties equal to the amount of the underpayment of lawful duties, in addition to the penalty
duties. The penalties and additional duties could be remitted or mitigated in whole or in part by the
Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to § 1618. In addition to the above substantive changes, the bill
would specifically provide for judicial review of the Secretary's determinations by the Customs Court.
Within 60 days after notice of receipt of a final determination of the Secretary of the Treasury upon a
petition for remission or mitigation, the petitioner could file a request for judicial review with the
United States Customs Court. The court would have jurisdiction to review the entire matter in a trial
de novo, and payment of any penalties and additional duties assessed by Treasury would be stayed
during the pendency of the Customs Court proceedings.
While the Roybal bill is a great improvement over the existing section 592, still there are various
criticisms that can be made of it. First, the bill does not state the offense as clearly as it might.
Basically, the bill accepts the wording of section 592, to which are added additional subparagraphs
distinguishing negligence cases from cases of fraud. Second, the bill continues to make the penalty
applicable to the merchandise, rather than to the person committing the offense. Accordingly, an
infocent consignee might still suffer the penalty on account of fraud committed by the shipper. Third,
while the bill would revise section 592, it does not make comparable changes in the criminal provisions
of 18 U.S.C. § 542. The bill would make loss or potential loss of revenues a requirement for imposition
of a penalty duty, yet a person could still be found guilty under section 542 whether or not the fraud or
false statement resulted in any loss of revenues. Fourth, the Customs Service probably would regard
the amount of penalty duties that could be imposed under the bill for intentional fraud to be too low to
have substantial deterrent effect. Fifth, the procedural emphasis in the bill is on judicial review, with
InternationalLawyer,Vol. 10, No. 2
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In August 1975 the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association called
for legislative reform of section 592 in the following resolution:
BE IT RESOLVED, that the American Bar Association recommends that Congress
adopt legislation reforming Section 592 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1592, in
the following respects.
1. By providing for civil penalties against the person violating the statute rather than
for forfeiture of goods involved;
2. By providing that such penalty shall be a reasonable amount in light of the
culpability of the violator and the consequences of the violation;
3. By providing reasonable informal administrative procedures by the Customs
Service, including adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the
assessment of a penalty;
4. By providing that the Customs Service must find a violation and assess a penalty on
the basis of findings of fact and a statement of reasons; and
5. By providing trial by a court of all factual and legal questions relating to the issues
of whether a violation occurred and the appropriate amount of the penalty.
Reform legislation along the lines suggested by this resolution would go far
toward eliminating the problems of section 592.16

no effect to improve the fairness of the administrative determination. Placing principal emphasis on
judicial review can make vindication of rights more expensive and can result in the Customs Court's
being clogged with numerous small and unimportant cases in which it would have to conduct de novo
trials.
"In drafting such legislation, and implementing regulations thereunder, it would be worthwhile to
give attention to certain features of the civil penalty procedures followed by the Internal Revenue
Service. These procedures combine the imposition of penalties which are reasonable in amount with
a number of levels of informal administrative review providing notice and an opportunity to be heard.
However, unless maximum customs penalties are to be held to the same proportionate levels as IRS
penalties, the customs procedures should go beyond those of IRS and provide for a reasoned
administrative decision based on findings of fact.
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